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Introduction: Epistemic Solidarity and Building  
on Our Knowledges
In October 2016, Dr. Tamika Cross, a Black physician, was on a Delta 
flight when a fellow passenger suddenly required medical assistance. As 
she tried to assist, she was stopped by the flight attendants who doubted 
her credentials as a physician. In the name of the patient’s health, they 
blocked Dr. Cross from responding. Making their biases even more 
evident, the flight attendants allowed another white male physician 
to respond to the patient’s needs without having to show his creden-
tials (Hauser 2016). Having heard this story, Dr. Fatima Cody, also 
a Black physician, began to carry a copy of her medical license with 
her. In  November 2018, Dr. Cody was faced with a similar situation to 
Dr. Cross’, where the flight attendants kept requiring reassurance that 
she was indeed a physician (Hauser 2018).
In both cases, the flight attendants’ “disbelief” that Dr. Cross and 
Dr.  Cody were physicians seemed to be grounded in the flight atten-
dants’ perception of what physicians look like: namely, not Black 
women. Many of us are able to recognize such dismissal for what it 
is – a belief that someone who looks or sounds like us1 cannot occupy a 
position of expertise in the perpetrator’s imagination. Dr. Cody learned 
from what had happened to Dr. Cross and to many before her. She was 
able to recognize the microaggressive dismissal of her physician license 
precisely because of her knowledge of incidents like Dr. Cross’ flight ex-
perience. This particular type of microaggressive act has a long history, 
where one’s authority is undermined due to societal racist, sexist, ageist 
assumptions and the like. In fact, one of the incidences that Chester 
M. Pierce – the psychologist who coined the term “microaggression” in 
1970 – describes is that of having his authority as a professor constantly 
challenged in minor and subtle ways. He writes:
I notice in a class I teach that after each session a white, not a black, 
will come up to me and tell me how the class should be structured 
or how the chairs should be placed or how there should be extra 
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meetings outside the classroom, etc … One could argue that I am 
hypersensitive, if not paranoid, about what I know every black will 
understand, is that it is not what the student says in this dialogue, it is 
how he approaches me, how he talks to me, how he seems to regard 
me. I was patronized. I was told, by my own perceptual distortions 
perhaps, that although I am a full professor on two faculties at a pres-
tigious university, to him I was no more than a big black ni**&r. I had 
to be instructed and directed as to how to render him more pleasure!
(Pierce 1970, 277)
Thus, from the inception of the term microaggression to today, many 
people of color (POC) and other minorities have lived and learned 
through iterations of experiences where strangers, colleagues, bosses, 
and subordinates alike dismiss our expertise. If and when marginalized 
folks accumulate enough personal experience and/or gain access to our 
shared and collective knowledges, then we are able to recognize it for 
what it is when it happens to us.
Throughout this chapter, I develop the idea that our knowledge of what 
counts as microaggression generates from and builds upon the  critical 
reflection of our cumulative experiences of marginalization. While most 
of my examples are from within the realm of academia – the environ-
ment I am most familiar with – the analysis itself is applicable to much 
broader contexts. The chapter proceeds as follows: in Section “Microag-
gressions: Some Background,” I cover some necessary  background about 
 microaggressions. Section “Epistemic Harms of  Microaggression,” 
lays out the conceptual framework for analyzing the primary and two 
 secondary epistemic harms of microaggression. In Section “Two Case 
Studies,” I provide two cases of microaggression in academia in order 
to unpack these concepts. I then discuss the primary epistemic harms 
in these two cases in Section “Primary Epistemic Harms.” Section 
“Knowing Our Worlds and Secondary Epistemic Harm” explores the 
two secondary harms of microaggressions, and the final section, “Ways 
Forward,” delves into a possible avenue of resistance to microaggression.
Microaggressions: Some Background
In this section, I lay out some groundwork needed to understand the 
 nature of microaggression, followed by a discussion of the particular 
value of sharing, a theme I return to in the concluding section of the paper. 
The scholarship on microaggression has flourished in the past couple of 
decades, mostly within the discipline of psychology. Recently though, phi-
losophers too have delved into the issue (see, for example, Schroer 2015, 
Brennan 2016, Tschaepe 2016, Fatima 2017, Friedlaender 2017, McTernan 
2018, Rini 2018, Freeman & Stewart 2018). Regina Rini describes micro-
aggression as “a relatively minor insulting event made disproportionately 
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harmful by taking part in an oppressive pattern of insults” (2018). In other 
words, a microaggressive incident, whether it is verbal or not, is harmful 
in part because it fits into a larger system of domination.
Part of the definition of microaggression that has developed encom-
passes those insults or slights that are unintentional on the part of the 
microaggressor. That is to say, a person who is well-intentioned can 
say or do things that are microaggressive even if they don’t know they 
are doing this and if they are not consciously doing it. Regardless of 
 intention, their singular action fits into the larger pattern of the racist,
sexist, ableist, transphobic structures and so on. Because they cause 
harm, microaggressions naturally invite questions of blameworthiness. 
Christina Friedlaender argues that although a person may microaggress 
another person unintentionally, we as individuals still have “a responsi-
bility to respond to the cumulative harm to which we have individually 
contributed” (Friedlaender 2018, 6). She gestures toward creating an 
environment where individual responsibility includes initiatives such as 
self-education about microaggression, self-reflection about one’s implicit 
biases, and learning about how these biases contribute to microaggres-
sive behavior on one’s part.
In response to the burgeoning scholarship on microaggression, there 
has also been some pushback. Lukianoff and Haidt claim in Coddling 
of the American Mind (2018) that American universities are cultivating 
fragile psyches in students, encouraging them to protest anything that 
makes them slightly uncomfortable. According to Lukianoff and Haidt, 
such policing of unintentional slights ensures that students cannot go 
on to counter the intellectual demands of life-after-college. Similarly, in 
The Rise of Victimhood Culture, Campbell and Manning (2018) argue 
that youth have become hypersensitive and that a focus on microaggres-
sion has created a “culture of victim-mentality.” The claim is that youth 
have been coddled to perceive small innocuous incidents as microag-
gression and this culture of calling out these trivial slights is detrimental 
to youth’s ability to function in the larger world. Furthermore, such a 
practice limits free speech and by shutting down certain topics perceived 
as possibly being offensive to the coddled mind. Regina Rini (2015) does 
an excellent job of responding to such claims:
The new culture of victimhood is not new, and it is not about 
 victimhood. It is a culture of solidarity, and it has always been with 
us, an underground moral culture of the disempowered. In the cul-
ture of solidarity, individuals who cannot enforce their honor or 
dignity instead make claim on recognition of their simple humanity. 
They publicize mistreatment not because they enjoy the status of 
victim but because they need the support of others to remain strong, 
and because public discomfort is the only possible route to redress.
(emphasis mine)
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In this chapter, I draw upon a particular aspect of Rini’s response: the 
need for “the support of others to remain strong” (ibid.). This support 
often lies within sharing our experiences among ourselves, for it is the 
sharing of our stories within marginalized communities that allows us 
to critically reflect on our cumulative experiences. For some of the mar-
ginalized, that accumulation of knowledges happens very early on, out 
of a necessity to survive. Folks who exist on multiple axes of margin-
alized identities are inundated with microaggressions earlier and more 
frequently in life. And because these iterations of events follow similar 
patterns of marginalization, we sometimes know what just happened – 
with our brains and our hearts connecting seemingly disparate life 
experiences in a split second, even as others undercut and doubt our 
assessment of our experiences.2
Much like Lauren Freeman and Heather Stewart (2018), I want to 
 center the discussion of microaggressions on the person who has been 
microaggressed, rather than on the microaggressor. There are many 
 adverse ramifications of microaggressions and some may even be a 
 matter of life and death, as could have been in case of delayed care in 
Dr. Cody and Dr. Cross’ examples above. However, I here maintain 
my focus on the epistemic harms in particular, in order to have a more 
 nuanced understanding of the microaggressed’s ability to generate and 
participate in making knowledge claims.
Epistemic Harms of Microaggression
In this section, I explore the primary and two types of secondary 
 epistemic harms of microaggression. By epistemic harm, I mean wrongs 
that result from being microaggressed that diminish a person’s capacity 
as a knower to generate and participate in making knowledge claims 
(Fricker 2007, Dotson 2014). The primary epistemic harm is the direct 
epistemic harm to the microaggressed.
Consider this example: upon finding out that an African American 
professor at his university went to Stanford, an administrator remarks 
“Oh, …. you went to Stanford? … It must have been easy for you to 
get in.” The first time that the Stanford graduate had heard a comment 
like that, he had just received his acceptance letter. He told a fellow 
white undergraduate about his acceptance to graduate school, and his 
friend remarked, “easy for you.” The interaction left him feeling very 
perturbed and at the time, he was uncertain why it made him feel that 
way. His friend had said it laughingly. He thought, maybe it was a bad 
joke, or perhaps his friend meant that it was easy for him to get in to 
Stanford because of all that he had achieved thus far and how hard he 
worked on his application. He also wondered if it was true that he got in 
because he was Black, and this thought filled him with self-doubt. It is 
within these initial sentiments that there is a primary epistemic harm of 
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the microaggression, where the recipient is unable to be sure how to even 
process and generate knowledge claims about their experience, prior to 
their sharing of the incident with others. Here we see that the microag-
gressed feels uneasy but cannot develop epistemic certainty about the 
nature of their experience as it is occurring. As I have written elsewhere, 
“Sometimes, when undergoing an experience, it is difficult to recognize 
certain patterns of disrespect motivated by racism, sexism, and xeno-
phobia” (Fatima 2017, 148). That failure to make knowledge claims to 
oneself (and to others) about the link between how these interactions 
make one feel (uneasy, embarrassment, etc.) and systemic oppression is 
itself a direct epistemic harm of microaggression. That is to say, often 
a primary epistemic harm of microaggression is the inability to gener-
ate knowledge claims with epistemic certainty about the nature of one’s 
own uncomfortable experience (for more, see Fatima 2017).
As time passes, one may gain epistemic certainty about the nature of 
their experiences either because of critical reflection, and/or because they 
continue to encounter other similar microaggression, and/or  because 
they hear about similar experiences of others. This becomes the case 
with our Ivy League graduate. Thus, when the administrator made that 
remark, she clearly implied that the professor was an affirmative action 
applicant to the Ivy League. Her statement undercuts the undergraduate 
accomplishments of the Ivy League graduate that enabled him to se-
cure his seat at Stanford. Through the administrator’s flippant remark, 
she swiftly undoes any knowledge claims that accompany the claim: “I 
went to Stanford for my PhD,” such as: “I am crème de le crème, I am 
the smartest of the smartest folks out there.” The Ivy League graduate 
can no longer assert those claims as implicit. This is yet another pri-
mary epistemic harm, a direct harm to his ability to generate and assert 
knowledge claims about himself because of this particular interaction, 
and more importantly, because of a history of similarly patterned inter-
actions throughout his career. In that interaction and the many others 
like it, a common racist myth is sustained, namely that minorities can 
never truly belong in Ivy League institutions unless they are “let in” 
through affirmative action. It reinforces the harmful and false beliefs 
about his intellectual acumen not just to those who heard the remark, 
but also in himself. He is left in the awkward position of actively having 
to refute the administrator’s seemingly “playful” remark.
The secondary epistemic harms of microaggression occur in the 
 aftermath of the initial microaggression, when people around the micro-
aggressed often cannot or do not see it as a microaggression. Consider 
the example where in a committee meeting of 15 white faculty mem-
bers and 1 faculty member of color, a senior white man states, without 
any critical reflection, that students of color do not have the skills and 
academic competence to get into top graduate schools. While the com-
ment is directed at students of color, the sole person of color in that 
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meeting reads the statement as the familiar indictment against all people 
of color, that they do not truly belong in academia. She is reminded of 
all the times that her own undergraduate- and graduate-level teachers 
underestimated her intellect and expressed surprise at her writing skills. 
In this moment, she points out to the senior colleague that this is not a 
 factual statement. Not only does no one recognize that the white man 
was  microaggressive in his statement, but two different white women 
 reprimand her for “making others out to be racist” and asking the 
woman of color to be more “civil” in her discourse.
The primary epistemic harm of this interaction is the epistemic impact 
of the claim that the white male faculty perpetuates, namely, that stu-
dents of color overall lack intellect. It not only piques doubt within the 
sole faculty of color about the intellectual abilities of students of color, 
it also places her in a position where she has to expend cognitive energy 
to make a decision about how to respond. Regardless of her outward 
response, the sole faculty of color is mentally fatigued because comments 
such as these have been a constant occurrence throughout her academic 
life. In that moment, she has to yet again make a choice between speak-
ing up and probably encountering hostility in return, or keeping silent 
and possibly eroding at her sense of self. It affects the sort of claims she 
can make about her place in academia and her relationships with her 
colleagues. When no one speaks up, she can see that she is alone, isolated 
within her place of work. And the recurring nature of these types of 
comments that cast minorities as not belonging within academia further 
solidifies that claim for her about herself.
The sole faculty of color is not only microaggressed in virtue of her 
identity as a person of color in the room, but now has to expend energy 
undoing this false claim. This is where the secondary epistemic harm 
of microaggression comes in. She has to deal with the aftermath of the 
microaggression as two white women present an inverted reality where it 
is the woman of color who is the wrongdoer. This secondary interaction 
has its own epistemic impact, namely, doubt within her about whether 
she has overreacted, inadvertently implied that the white male faculty is 
a racist, and doubts about her approach to address the situation.
I explore two distinct types of secondary harms of microaggression, 
where the two often overlap and can be inseparable. The first sort is 
when folks around the microaggressed person doubt or gaslight them, 
resulting in the microaggressed questioning their own reality. Veronica 
Ivy [Rachel McKinnon] defines gaslighting as when “the hearer of testi-
mony [typically about a harm or injustice committed against the speaker] 
raises doubts about the speaker’s reliability at perceiving events accu-
rately” (2017, 168). More importantly, it “is aimed at getting another not 
to take herself seriously as an interlocutor” (Abramson 2014, 2). For the 
purpose of this paper, it is not important if the interlocutor intends to 
gaslight or not, as long as they actively provide alternative explanations 
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to the assessment of the experience of the microaggressed. As I have 
discussed elsewhere (2017)
One of the common responses to hearing someone tell of an in-
cidence of microaggression is an attempt to offer either alternate 
explanations of what the listener thinks actually happened or an 
alternate account of the well-meaning motivations of the perpetra-
tors. They may offer explanation such as “I don’t think he meant 
it like that,” or “It is very possible that she was actually trying to 
help you.” They may also suggest other benign possibilities such 
as “well, I know it is not common that they do this, but they are 
simply following the letter of the law,” etc. If the person from 
the  marginalized social location is unsure about how to process 
the said microaggression, the listener’s explanation compounds 
their doubt.
(Fatima 2017, 152)
In our case above, when the sole faculty of color points out the 
 microaggressive comment of the white male faculty, two faculty 
 members who are white women undercut the reality perceived by the 
microaggressed. This results in the microaggressed doubting her own 
perception of reality.
The second form of secondary epistemic harm of microaggression is 
what I term as absence of shared cumulative epistemic resources that 
impedes the ability on part of the microaggressed to make knowledge 
claims about their experience of microaggression to others. This is often 
because of deficiency of shared cumulative hermeneutical resources.
In her book, Epistemic Injustice (2007), Miranda Fricker distin-
guishes between two forms of epistemic harms: testimonial and her-
meneutic  injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer does not 
give due credibility to the speaker due to prejudice (Fricker 2007, 1). 
José  Medina (2013) points out that epistemic injustice does not just oc-
cur due to credibility deficit unfairly allotted to some (as Fricker points 
out), rather it is a function of both credibility deficits and excesses, and 
in comparison with the epistemic authority of the speaker. For exam-
ple, imagine a  female car mechanic tells a customer that the car’s brake 
pads need changing. The customer dismisses her expert diagnosis, and 
looks around for another (male) mechanic. This microaggressive be-
havior, where his dismissal of her expertise in favor of someone who 
has more currency due to their gender, emanates from prejudice against 
women being experts in auto mechanics. Furthermore, the credibility 
deficit is disproportional to her actual expertise as a mechanic. The cus-
tomer locates another mechanic who is a man and is wearing a badge 
with the word “trainee” on it. The customer asks this junior trainee me-
chanic to look over his car. This mechanic delivers the same report to 
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the customer as his female superior had delivered. The customer trusts 
the information coming from the second mechanic because of credi-
bility excess placed in his testimony, in particular in proportion to his 
actual expertise (which is less than the female mechanic).
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when one’s experiences are obscured 
from collective understanding because of unequal social power rela-
tionships (Fricker 2007, 154–155). In the case of microaggressions, the 
microaggressed is unfairly disadvantaged in their capacity to convey to 
others their experience of being microaggressed because of lack of shared 
resources that would help others understand their experiences as such. 
In both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice within cases of micro-
aggression, the epistemic agency of the microaggressed participating in 
making knowledge claims is diminished. More importantly, in the con-
text of the second type of secondary epistemic harm of microaggression, 
my claim here is that those collective resources provide an accumulation 
of knowledge about similarly patterned acts of microaggression, allow-
ing folks to recognize how the act fits into larger structures of oppression 
and call out those behavioral configurations as such.
When an incident of microaggression is relayed to another person, a 
world is co-constructed between the confidant and the microaggressed. 
The communication builds a subjectivity together where within this 
co-constructed world, the microaggressed and the confidant situate 
themselves together and together, make sense of how the microaggressed 
view their own experience. That co-constructed subjectivity does not 
form in a vacuum. It relies on members of marginalized groups making 
sense of our experiences within societal narratives that are already fa-
miliar to others who are similarly marginalized, and more than often, 
those are the narratives (and often stereotypes and myths) perpetuated 
by those who are dominantly situated.
Building on the work of José Medina (2013), Audrey Yap (2017) 
 argues that how much epistemic credibility we allot someone is also 
 contingent on the narratives that are available to us in our social imag-
inary. She states that “[o]ur understanding of some concepts can be 
shaped by  stories involving them, shaping our collective understanding 
of how  certain events ‘normally’ take place” (Yap 2017, 8). This is to say, 
when stories do not follow the patterns we are familiar with, we have 
a hard time granting their narrator epistemic credibility. Furthermore, 
the recognition of those patterns as patterns is a result of an accumu-
lation of being aware of similar experiences. Consequently, the lack of 
cumulative epistemic resources restricts the sorts of patterns of microag-
gression, and this deficit can contribute to gaslighting another person’s 
sense of reality (this is where the two types of secondary harms become 
inseparable). When, as a microaggressed person, one is not familiar 
enough with similar patterns of microaggressions and one’s testimony 
is repeatedly dismissed, gaslighting can begin to warp one’s own sense 
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of reality. Kate Abramson writes about the toll of folks dismissing your 
perceptions as unwarranted. She states:
This appearance is partly mitigated by remembering that these are 
vignettes [of gaslighting] in the lives of women for whom, as a rule 
of thumb, this sort of interaction has become pervasive. A single 
instance of one person saying to another, “that’s crazy” may not 
appear – may not be – an instance of someone trying to destroy 
another’s standing to make claims. But when that form of interac-
tion is iterated over and over again, when counterevidence to “that’s 
crazy” is dismissed, when nothing is treated as salient evidence for 
the possibility of disrupting the initial accusation, appearances shift.
(Abramson 2014, 11)
That is to say, that the person loses epistemic credibility among their 
peers; subsequently, their standing to make claims about their own expe-
riences erodes. But more importantly, they also begin to slowly distrust 
themselves as well as a reliable epistemic agent (Govier 1993). They may 
begin to see themselves as paranoid (Pierce 1970, Fatima 2017), not sim-
ply because those around them refuse to access epistemic resources of 
the marginalized, but also because the microaggressed themselves do 
not have the access to the cumulative experiences that allows them to 
recognize microaggressive patterns. This loss of epistemic creditabil-
ity in oneself is further complicated by power relations, as Abramson 
(2014) notes. When the confidant doubts, or worse, gaslights the mi-
croaggressed and there is power inequity between them, it can further 
shake the microaggressed’s sense of certainty of their own experience. 
The microaggressed may think, going back to a previous example, that 
if senior colleagues are insisting that she has misinterpreted the events, 
then perhaps she should trust their wisdom over her own sense of the 
events. She may begin to grant the dominantly situated person’s claims 
and  excessive credibility at the expense of her standing as a knower of 
her own experiences. The following three sections expand upon the 
 primary epistemic harm and the two secondary epistemic harms of 
 microaggression through the use of two case studies.
Two Case Studies
It would be helpful to further explore the epistemic harm of microag-
gression by working through a few instances of it. Here I describe two 
 incidents and explore the ways that they are examples of microaggression. 
I find it worthwhile to examine how each incident is a microaggression 
because more often than not, the inability to understand an uncom-
fortable incident as a microaggression is itself linked to the primary 
 epistemic harm of microaggression. By exploring the ways that each case 
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is a microaggression, I actively contribute to both the ability to make 
epistemic claims about such incidents, and to the cumulative epistemic 
resources that aid us in pattern recognition of future microaggressions.
Case 1: An academic researcher receives a paper back from a  managing 
editor with feedback for improvement from two reviewers. The  comments 
are unusually harsh. As the author initially reads through them, she is 
embarrassed and intellectually demoralized. She feels like an imposter 
who has nothing valuable to contribute to the field. However, after leav-
ing the feedback alone for some time – as all academics are advised to 
do – the author begins to think that many of the comments are due to 
the reviewer’s unfamiliarity with the literature. Moreover, it appears that 
some of the comments might possibly be motivated by reviewer #2’s bias 
against non-native English speakers – the author had identified herself 
as an immigrant in her writing. The tone of review is condescending 
and sarcastic. For instance, the reviewer asks “Is this a country?” when 
the author first uses and explains the term “White spaces” in her pa-
per. The reviewer does not ask the author to further explain the term 
“white spaces.” Rather, it seems they are incredulous at the audacity 
of a POC to be generating knowledge in the white space of academia. 
They also ask if the author is “making terms up like ‘minority mothers’” 
and whether LGBTQ mothers can “actually mother and give birth”! It 
became clear from their comments that the reviewer was not unfamiliar 
with critical feminist literature on the mothering, but rather, they were 
undercutting the author’s expertise by constantly asking them to re-work 
well-established concepts within critical theory. And the  reviewer did 
not stop there. They pinpointed linguistic  “mistakes” that were more ap-
propriately stylistic issues and suggested random substitutions for words 
throughout the paper, such as using the word “imperialism” instead of 
what the author used, namely,  “colonialism,” “demonstrated the fact” 
instead of “attested to the fact,” and “parental commitment” instead of 
“parental engagement.” In each case, the author had deliberately used the 
words she had found to be more fitting for the point she wanted to make. 
Not entirely sure of her assessment of bias, the author first consults a 
woman of color (WOC) friend, and then posts some of these comments 
in an online forum of WOC academics to get a sense of whether she is be-
ing hypersensitive – a common criticism when marginalized folks voice 
discontent at microaggressions. Hordes of other WOC academics share 
their own experiences of microaggressive non-constructive comments 
and confirm the author’s initial inkling about the bias in the reviewer’s 
comments. The reactions help the author tremendously. They allow her 
to gain some epistemic certainty about her preliminary suspicions. They 
allow her to respond to the reviewers’ “objections” while holding her 
ground on theoretical and linguistic choices, and ultimately not to ditch 
the paper as she had originally planned. In a different conversation, the 
author brings up the microaggressive nature of the reviewer’s comments 
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in a casual setting with her white colleagues who were discussing her 
paper. They all began to second guess the author’s assessment of the 
review. “Perhaps, the reviewer meant this….,” “are you sure, you didn’t 
misread what the reviewer actually said,” “oh, I have had a word or two 
substituted and I am a native speaker, so I don’t think it has to do with 
the fact you are an immigrant,” etc. It was only when the author, with 
the permission of concerned WOC, told the white colleagues the over-
whelming affirmation she had received from other WOC that the white 
colleagues affirmed the author’s assessment of her own reality.
Case 2: A hiring committee member asks a WOC education scholar 
job candidate, who works on social justice in education, “do you think 
your research fits within educational research?” Here an academic job 
candidate is asked about their research at an interview. It would be hard 
for some to think of the question as microaggressive, regardless of how 
it might have made the candidate feel. Some, especially those who are 
dominantly socially located within her discipline, might simply see the 
question as an attempt to see if and how the candidate’s scholarship fits 
within the field of education. But note that the hiring committee did not 
ask how it fits, but rather whether it fits. The candidate has a hard time 
explaining to others, post-incident, why she knew that this question was 
microaggressive and knew that the hiring committee was not “ready” to 
hire a POC from the global south. Based on the candidate’s account of 
the event, I want to argue below that this case is indeed an instance of 
microaggression. The candidate states:
When the question of whether my scholarship belongs in education 
was asked, I immediately knew that they thought I did not belong 
there – just like the question “where are you really from?”. Immedi-
ately I felt like an alien to the discipline, and I thought my response 
to this question was risky given that I was the candidate. I told them, 
“yes it does, and if it does not, then these conversations need to be 
pushed into mainstream educational research.” When I sat in the 
train, I felt my response was unintelligent and instead I should have 
said that bringing race, gender, ethnicity, – an intersectional lens, 
does not deem my research as outside the discipline of education, 
rather the inclusion of such analysis only provides validity to the 
existence of our discipline. I was really upset with myself that my re-
sponse was quite reactive, but I was not expecting this question and 
it just made me feel that not only my physical being (being the only 
WOC there) but also my research was unwelcome there. This was 
a position for social justice research in education. I felt very angry 
that they knew my research from my application, why shortlist me, 
invite me, only to dismiss my work in the end? Maybe among the six 
 candidates, they did indeed choose the best one, the most suitable 
one and that was probably the conclusion formed by the other four 
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candidates who did not get in. I was just upset at that question and I 
felt all the events of that day were perfectly summed up in that ques-
tion. The all-white panel, the questions unrelated to my research, 
presentation, the informal but very formal lunch, and finally the 
interview. I just felt I was there being accommodated, a temporary 
guest, and tickbox exercise for diversity initiatives in HR recruit-
ment policy. They doubted the place of my research, and I ended up 
doubting my scholarship, whether I will amount to anything, or will 
I just be a diversity token. All this from supposedly critical research-
ers that were concerned with social justice research.
(Anonymous, 2019, personal communication)
The candidate knew that the hiring department had a bias against h iring 
a POC – a bias of the following variety: we are committed to promoting 
diversity within our faculty, but just not through this particular diverse 
person.3 The candidate could tell from the tone of the question that the 
hiring committee member did not regard her research as serious aca-
demic scholarship. She also learned that all of the other candidates for 
the job were white and that none of them had been asked this question 
(small subfield where the candidates knew one another). The question, 
“does your scholarship fit?,” appears to be the only explicit comment that 
the candidate can remotely point to as an example of the fact that she 
was microaggressed, but throughout the interview, many other smaller 
things happened that give context to that question being justifiably expe-
rienced as a microaggression. For example, the committee did not engage 
at all with the candidate’s scholarship that was on POC in education; 
instead, after the candidate’s research presentation, they asked questions 
about how many dissertation students she can realistically supervise. 
This lack of engagement with her scholarship at a research- intensive in-
stitution showed her that an intersectional analysis of the field was not 
considered serious scholarship. Later, the candidate thought to herself 
that the department clearly was aware of all of her research projects from 
the initial application. With that realization, she became even surer that 
she was only shortlisted so that the department could feel good about 
their “commitment to diversity” by inviting a person of color to the cam-
pus interview round. The candidate knew that the question about her 
scholarship was microaggressive within this expanded context and the 
context of her lived experiences where time and time again, she has been 
shown her “place” within different academic situations.
Primary Epistemic Harms
In this section, I look at the primary epistemic harms of the microaggres-
sion cases above. In the first case, the author initially doubts her own in-
tellectual ability as a result of the condescending review that she received 
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on a paper submission. This is the primary epistemic harm associated 
with the microaggression, the most direct harm. That is, the primary 
harm is the author’s initial conclusion that her intellectual abilities are 
not on par with others in academia, an unwarranted claim about her in-
tellectual acumen. The exclusionary and admonishing tone of the review 
fits into larger oppressive structures that have not only systemically kept 
life inside the ivory tower out of reach for POC, and have made it seem 
as though POC are incapable of being rational and intellectual enough. 
The other primary epistemic harm of microaggression in this case is that 
the comments from reviewer #2 could potentially halt the intellectual 
growth of the author as a researcher, if she had decided to give up the 
project altogether. Such comments maintain the exclusion of folks like 
the author from participating and generating knowledge to contribute 
to the construction of the discipline. This harm is both experienced by 
the microaggressed in terms of their scholarly development and career 
opportunities (non-epistemic harms), and, indirectly, also a harm to the 
larger discipline by robbing the discipline of much needed diverse per-
spectives (again, non-epistemic harms).
Upon reflection, she begins to think that the reviewers have not in 
fact offered much in the way of constructive feedback at all. None of 
the comments are helpful to the author insofar as none of them help to 
improve the clarity or the arguments of the paper. Instead, with time, the 
author realizes that the reviewers have dispensed gatekeeping steeped 
in bias and ignorance, where the comments simply mean to assert the 
intellectual dominance of the reviewers and the outsider status of the 
author. She voices her frustrations, first to another WOC, and then in a 
forum of WOC academics where she knows that she can trust others to 
set her straight if need be. The response from other WOC offers her the 
support she needs “to remain strong,” as Rini writes (2015). Thus, in 
case #1, there are several different types of harm: the primary epistemic 
harm of the microaggressive comments that leave the author feeling like 
an imposter and the diminishing, through gatekeeping, of her ability to 
contribute as a knower to her field.
In case #2, the primary epistemic harm is the way that the candidate 
censors herself from participating in her epistemic communities. Unlike 
in case #1, the microaggressed is able to make epistemic claims about her 
experience to herself. Even in the moment, the candidate knows what is 
happening to her and can make epistemic claims about her  reality rooted 
in truths. The primary epistemic harm then is what Kristie D otson 
(2011) calls “testimonial smothering,” a form of epistemic violence 
where a speaker truncates their own testimony, knowing that their audi-
ence  cannot/will not give it appropriate uptake. In this particular case, 
knowing that her testimony about her experiences of the job market will 
be unintelligible, she smothers or buries it in polite smiles of “better luck 
next time.” In that moment, she is censoring herself.
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Knowing Our Worlds and Secondary Epistemic Harm
In this section, I concentrate on the secondary epistemic harms of 
 microaggression, namely, harms that occur in the aftermath of the 
 microaggression. The first type of secondary epistemic harm occurs 
when others doubt or gaslight the microaggressed on her assessment of 
her experiences. The second type of secondary epistemic harm occurs 
due to a lack of cumulative epistemic resources that make it difficult for 
the microaggressed to convey their reality to others.
Imagine living in an epistemic twilight zone, a world where many of 
your lived experiences are regularly misunderstood, distorted, dis-
missed, erased, or simply rejected as unbelievable. Perhaps you can’t 
find words to capture an experience that you know to be very real. 
Or, perhaps there is a local vernacular, but it is rendered nonsensical 
by listeners outside of your community. Are the “shared” epistemic 
resources that structure the unlevel knowing field so resilient in the 
long run that they absorb, erase, ridicule and repel your words?
(Bailey 2014, 62)
Here Bailey speaks of, what she calls “unlevel knowing fields” where 
those that are non-dominantly situated are disadvantaged in ways that 
maintain their epistemic oppression. As Bailey states, the epistemic 
claims of folks who are non-dominantly situated are rendered nonsen-
sical, erased, and/or even repulsive. In both case #1 and case #2, the 
microaggressed have to deal with the aftermath of the microaggression 
and experience secondary harms.
In case #1, when the reviewer nitpicked word choices for a non- 
native English speaker, initially, the WOC author only has an inkling 
that the comments are microaggressive, but does not have the cumula-
tive knowledge of such experiences of gatekeeping. But her suspicion is 
then validated by other WOC peers who have had similar experiences 
of gatekeeping (see Dotson 2012a for an account of how gatekeeping 
operates within the discipline of philosophy). It was only when she ac-
cesses the collective hermeneutical resources of other WOC academics 
that she developed the “cognitive confidence, and increased communi-
cative facility” (Fricker 207, 148) to make sense of her experience as a 
microaggression.
The feedback not only allows the author to become more epistemi-
cally confident in her assessment of the comments from reviewer #2 as 
microaggressive, but it also provides her with the appropriate epistemic 
community that has gone through similar experiences such that she 
can critically assess her own experience via her access to the  collective 
epistemic resources of WOC. Finding this epistemic community, to 
a large extent, not only helps address the primary epistemic harm of 
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microaggression, but also helps her deal with the aftermath. Recall that 
when the author relays her assessment of the reviewers’ comments as 
microaggressive, her white colleagues gaslight her. The author is able 
to resist this secondary harm of gaslighting and to hold her epistemic 
ground in large part due to epistemic support garnered from other 
WOC’s  experiences. In this scenario, as Ivy [McKinnon] and many other 
standpoint theorists before her have argued, the colleagues who have not 
believed her “ought to put their own perceptions largely aside and trust 
the  testimony of the marginalized person” (2017, 171). This is because 
the marginalized person is more proximally socially situated in ways 
that allows them to more accurately evaluate the harm inflicted on them 
(for a discussion of standpoint theory within the context of microaggres-
sions, see Freeman and Stewart’s contribution to this volume).
Moreover, in response to her white colleagues’ dismissal of her claims 
to have been microaggressed, if the author in case #1 did not have access 
to an online forum of WOC academics, then she might have altered 
her paper significantly to suit the reviewer’s bias or simply abandoned 
the project altogether. But this would have caused harm to the author 
herself, as it would have stunted the growth of that particular research 
agenda. Furthermore, there would have also been an additional second-
ary harm to her discipline from the abandoned research paper, as the 
discipline would not grow as much and benefit from diverse perspec-
tives, skill sets, and epistemological standpoints; instead the discipline 
would maintain its narrow focus.
In case #2, the job candidate is deeply affected by the outcome. The 
result of the committee’s bias not only has a devastating impact on the 
candidate, that of being underemployed, but such bias is also harmful 
to academia more generally, since in not hiring a POC, the discipline is 
prevented from learning from the knowledge of a diverse pool of schol-
ars. While it is indeed infuriating to see such harms time and again, 
here I focus on just the secondary epistemic harm of the microaggressive 
question in case #2: “do you think your research fits within educational 
research?” This knowledge of how and why that question is microag-
gressive is not something that the candidate can easily transfer to others, 
despite her knowing it. If the candidate attempts to relay her assessment 
to others, her testimony would not be considered sufficient evidence of 
microaggression occurring by those dominantly situated. And even if the 
description in Section “Two Case Studies” is sufficient to make the case 
for the existence of microaggression, most people who are dominantly 
situated do not want to spend the time or the energy to understand all 
these various threads of experiences: experiences of the interview day in 
its entirety, experiences of that particular POC’s life, and experiences of 
POC life in academia in general. Most of those who are dominantly situ-
ated cannot/do not delve adequately into the epistemic pool of resources 
of the marginalized person to give context to the microaggression 
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(see, for example, Lukianoff and Haidt’s dismissal of the reality of micro-
aggressions for precisely this reason (2018)). As I have stated elsewhere,
it requires much effort to see the world from other people’s per-
spectives. Most people do not care enough or are too far removed 
from another’s social location to travel comfortably into “strange” 
worlds …. [where they] may be unable, unwilling, or uninterested in 
making the effort required to understand the values and experiences 
of others.
(Fatima 2013, 352)
The microaggressed is painfully aware of this reality. Thus, the s econd 
form of secondary epistemic harm of microaggression is when the 
 microaggressed suffers from a lack of shared cumulative epistemic 
 resources of the marginalized that can give language to one’s experience 
of  microaggression. In such situations, the microaggressed is unable to 
make knowledge claims about the harm that has occurred to them in a 
way that would get any uptake from others.
Ways Forward
In this concluding section of the chapter, I look at the value of  sharing 
our experiences of microaggression and explore possible avenues for 
epistemic certainty. In case #1 (about biased reviewers’ comments),  after 
confiding with other WOC, the microaggressed gains a good degree of 
epistemic certainty about their assessment of their own experiences. 
This is in large part because over the many cumulative experiences of the 
marginalized, sufficient collective hermeneutical resources have been de-
veloped that allow the microaggressed to make sense of their experience, 
to have access to language that acknowledges microaggressive patterns, 
and for others around the microaggressed to understand and validate 
the experience as such via familiarity with the narrative of what micro-
aggression look like. It is this familiarity of patterns that is one way to 
help us resist the secondary harm of microaggression. In case #1, those 
cumulative hermeneutical resources are at least shared among academic 
women of color, specifically among non-native English speakers. In such 
cases, once the pattern is recognized as fitting into structures and histo-
ries of oppression and colonization of our languages, the microaggressed 
is able to deal with the aftermath in a way that is not as damaging to 
their capacity as a knower. Once the author is able to recognize and give 
language to the practice of gatekeeping scholarship by POC, she is better 
able to resist the subversion of her reality by her white colleagues, and is 
able to convey to others the harm (epistemic and otherwise) committed 
by the reviewers. But it matters greatly who the microaggressed is con-
fiding in, because that determines the sorts of narratives the confidants 
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are familiar with, and consequently, can  impact the subjectivity co- 
constructed between the microaggressed person and their confidant.
Case #2 is slightly different. It is not just that the job candidate will 
be disbelieved when she tries to convey to others that she was micro-
aggressed in her job interview because of identity prejudice alone. It 
is also not simply the case that she lacks the collective hermeneutical 
 resources of the marginalized, though that does plays a role. In case #2, 
the  microaggressed knows that she was microaggressed. If she were to 
talk to women of color academics who have recently been through the 
wringer of academic job interviews, and told them how she felt wronged, 
they would probably understand her claims for they too have faced 
 exclusion for the sort of scholarship they do. Yet, since she does not 
have access to similar previous experiences of her own or to the “right” 
 confidants, she does not benefit from cumulative experiences that allow 
her to recognize her experience within a pattern of behavior and give 
language to the incident. She knows that the more she attempts to get 
some sort of validation of how she was microaggressed from others who 
are differentially situated, the more she will be exhausted and utterly 
dissatisfied (non-epistemic harms). Sarah Ahmed writes about the ex-
haustion of coming up against seemingly invisible barriers to equity:
And also if we shatter because of what we come against, but what we 
come up against is not revealed, it might seem as if we are  shattering 
ourselves … it might be assumed that we have tripped ourselves up, 
that we have wrong-footed ourselves; that our willfulness is behind 
our downfall.
(Ahmed 2017, 175)
This is to say, our despondency/anger/affective-or-otherwise reaction to 
being microaggressed and, in particular, to suffering its secondary epis-
temic harms, appears to others to be a result of our own torturous mind-
set. Furthermore, because sometimes microaggressions are invisible to 
others, i.e. they are (willfully or otherwise) unfamiliar with the sorts of 
narratives that the microaggressed experience, articulating them makes 
one even more visible to those around them. One becomes visible as one 
begins to articulate experiences that make one stand out, look irrational, 
or incoherent, as their world makes little sense to knowers of dominant 
epistemic ideologies.
Dotson (2014) adds to the category of Fricker’s first two epistemic 
harms, testimonial and hermeneutical harms. Dotson describes a third- 
order epistemic exclusion where epistemological systems are  themselves 
inadequate. For Dotson, we must ask ourselves where the  parameters 
and boundaries for our existing epistemological systems are (as opposed 
to the inefficiencies and insufficiencies within that system), and what 
our epistemological systems do not yet allow us to acknowledge. So even 
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while the knowers of dominant ideologies may think of the candidate 
in case #2 as a competent knower, and are willing to be epistemically 
open, they (those dominantly situated, but even the marginalized, the 
oppressed, the microaggressed) may still not be able to work outside 
the larger epistemological framework. Being contained within these 
 dominant epistemological frameworks keeps us within environments 
where oppressive systems will inevitably exist, and consequently, micro-
aggressions will inevitably occur. For example, in case #2, our commit-
ment to the concept meritocracy within academia – a flawed concept 
at best – plays into how we review and assess applications of minority 
candidates, without acknowledging the limited (and colonial) ways we 
view our disciplines and our scholars. It is being confined within these 
dominant epistemological frameworks that create the epistemic environ-
ment such that there is a general lack of understanding of the harmful 
nature of the question asked at the interview in case #2.
However, all is not lost. In case #2, the candidate knows from experi-
ences of various iterations of discrimination over her life, where she has 
been dismissed, gaslit, and/or deemed unintelligible, that she will have 
a very difficult time articulating to others the bias within the interview 
and the countless ways she was microaggressed. One might think the 
difficulty is in part because the bias is not contained within a neat snide 
remark and that in case #2, it can only make sense when contextualized 
within a charitable and critical reflection of cumulative experiences of 
marginalized folks in academia. However, I want to claim that the rea-
son that some cases appear to be a clear-cut case of microaggression 
is precisely because POC have already developed a shared knowledge 
base rooted in their shared, cumulative experiences about the nature of 
such incidents. In other words, cases such as case #2 are not different 
because they do not require contextualization and critical reflection of 
cumulative experiences, rather that work has already been done if we 
take seriously the narratives of marginalized folks. And herein lies hope. 
As we work through, unpack our experiences, explore why they make 
us feel uneasy, recognize certain patterns, and share them with other 
marginalized folks, we inevitably contribute to the cumulative epistemic 
resources needed to resist the epistemic harms of microaggression. In 
situations such as case #2 where it is a lifetime of messy experiences that 
contextualize the microaggressive utterance, that understanding has yet 
to be recognized as knowledge and is rendered unintelligible by domi-
nant epistemically oppressive systems.
As Gaile Pohlhaus (2102) and Kristie Dotson (2012) argue, when ot hers 
willfully refuse to employ hermeneutical resources of the m arginalized, 
they do so in order to maintain their own epistemic comfort. They refuse 
to make any effort to inhabit the worlds of the marginalized, so that they 
can deflect any real epistemic friction away from their existing world 
view (Medina 2013). This refusal, especially at the hands of seemingly 
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progressive allies within academia, can make one resentful or defeated 
over time. That defeat bears its own cost for the microaggressed. It can 
erase hope or make a person feel despondent, such that their hope in fu-
ture possibilities slowly begins to diminish. They may eventually give up 
on academia altogether (a non-epistemic harm, stemming from epistemic 
harm). I do want to note though that the bitterness, the resentfulness, 
anger, and even what appears to be defeat (and even liberation from 
shackles of toxic environments around us) all have their place within the 
context of being pigeonholed as irrational, unintelligent, not nuanced 
enough. For example, Rini (2018) makes a compelling argument that 
anger is a tactically useful and morally justified response to microaggres-
sion. At the very minimum, these feelings help us maintain our sense of 
dignity in these particular scenarios and all warranted responses to the 
epistemic harms of microaggressions.
I want to end by reiterating a point made by Dotson that “[a] catch-
all theory of epistemic injustice is an unrealistic expectation. Epistemic 
oppression is simply too pervasive” (Dotson 2012, 41). In line with 
 Dotson’s insight, here I have only offered a preliminary analysis of the 
sorts of epistemic harms of microaggression, and while my examples 
cover cases within academia, the analysis itself is also very pertinent 
to microaggression outside of the academic settings. Furthermore, what 
has become clear from an analysis of the secondary harms of microag-
gression is that the mere act of attempting to articulate one’s experience 
in microaggressive situations can be an act of resistance with heavy cost 
to the testifier. This is especially true in situations such as case #1 and #2 
where knowledges of the marginalized have not become part and parcel 
of society’s communal epistemic resources and in some cases – such as 
case #2, when they are beyond the parameters of existing epistemologi-
cal systems. In these moments, where we simultaneously choose to take 
on the burden and the liberation of sharing our lived reality, we risk 
being seen as bitter/ irrational/ angry/ paranoid/ troublemaker; we risk 
being excluded from being participators in production of knowledge. 
When we relay these acts of microaggression, we may do it not simply 
for the chance of gaining some epistemic certainty for ourselves, some 
form of redress, but we also (inadvertently /intentionally) add to the 
voices of the lived realties of our communities, contributing to our col-
lective knowledges, to the hermeneutical resources of the marginalized 
such that those liminals that experience microaggressions after us can 
have the epistemic tools to assert their capacity as knowers.
Notes
 1 Throughout the paper, I use “us” to refer to marginalized folks, and some-
times more specifically to people of color.
 2 I was once leading a class discussion and we were discussing our experiences 
of being stopped by the cops as POC. Then a young white woman asked 
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earnestly, “how do you know that’s why you were stopped?” and almost in 
union, several POC responded “you just know.” This form of knowledge 
is very valuable in assessing harm. It is not that we just know but that we 
know, that we know because of culmination of our experiences and/or ac-
cess to the lived reality of other POC. (To her credit, the white woman did 
respond in the best way possible though – not by undercutting our assess-
ment of POC student experiences – but by saying: “Oops, did I just let my 
white fly?”)
3 A New York Times article lays out this variety of bias in their analysis of 
why people have a hard time voting for any particular woman for the job of 
the President of the United States (see Astor 2019).
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